Introduction

Did the Intifada Lead to Oslo? The "Canonical" History of the First Intifada
The First Intifada has for decades been used as the principal explanation for the need to fundamentally reexamine Israel's policies on terror. More precisely, the question concerns explaining and apologizing for the new policy of strategic concessions made by Israel to terrorists. Concessions, negotiations, and cooperation with terrorists have replaced the semi-legendary principles of Israel's anti-terrorist strategy, which had once spelled out "No negotiating with terrorists," the impossibility of concessions, and persecution and destruction of terrorists regardless of where they may be hiding.
The primary aim of the present study is to analyze the events of the First Intifada, focusing on the question of how well grounded the decisions made at the time were to introduce radical changes in the terror-fighting strategy. Most sources treat the process at Oslo as an outgrowth of Israel's inability to suppress the Arab riots. We will consider an alternative interpretation in addition to this widespread view. The alternative approach will be based on understanding Oslo as the outcome of developments dictated by certain interests within Israel.
suffering, and humiliation inflicted upon the "occupied" 2 territories (check posts, Jewish construction) provoked due discontent (legitimate grievances) on the part of the Arabs. The discontent led to protests (see, for instance, Ensalaco, 2008) 3 or accounted for the protests being channeled toward adopting increasingly violent forms (Levitt, 2006) . 4 According to a more neutral account, the protests arose spontaneously, as a "natural" development (White, 2012: p. 296). Notwithstanding the draconian repressive measures taken, putting the protests down proved impossible. It was these protests endorsed by world public opinion that made the Israeli leadership-which had previously never agreed to make concessions-reconsider its policies (Shindler, 2013; Ziv, 2007) . The initiation of the peace process and the Oslo Accords (the Madrid Conference, according to some accounts) led to the end of the First
Intifada (in 1993).
The account cited above is presented in official sources, Israeli ones foremost among them 5 ; in research literature (see above), including Israeli studies (Ziv, 2007) ; in educational materials 6 ; and in popular layman's accounts. 7 The nearly universally accepted chronology of the events of the First Intifada (its beginning dated to December 1987, the conclusion in September 1993) is constructed in conformity with the position this spells out.
We propose two principal alternative hypotheses to explain the reaction of the Israeli leadership to the Intifada and the signing of the Oslo Accords: 2 Strictly speaking, these territories are not occupied. See, for instance, Great Britain's obligations as per the mandate issued by the League of Nations for Palestine: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp; the Levy Commission report: http://www.pmo.gov.il/Documents/doch090712.pdf (in Hebrew); for the official translation of the conclusions and recommendations into English see: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/D9D07DCF58E781C585257A3A005956A6; for an unofficial translation of the legal argumentation see: http://elderofziyon.blogspot.cz/2012/07/english-translationof-legal-arguments.html#.VD5q1MIcTcs. For an explanation of the unanimity in which the foreign affairs agencies of the old democracies supported the dubious occupation thesis, see the "Interest Groups: The Diplomats and the Voter" section below. 3 Kindle locations: 1623; 3716-3722. 4 "Hamas capitalizes on the suffering and frustrations triggered by Israeli settlement and occupation policies. Israeli settlements-especially those deep in the West Bank…" (Kindle location: 2278-2279). 5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Israeli history timeline: http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/IsraelAt50/Pages/Timeline%20of%20Events-%20Half%20a%20Century%20of%20Independence.aspx#1987 6 For example, materials disseminated by the US Institute for Curriculum Services, which offers materials on Jewish history for schools: http://www.icsresources.org/content/factsheets/ArabIsraeliTimeline.pdf 7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Intifada 1. The state proved unable to suppress the spontaneous-unless it was organized-protests of the Arabs living in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza; it was thus compelled to change its policies, shifting from a strategy of suppressing terrorism to one of pacifying terrorists.
2. The unrest was fed and fanned by signals received from Israeli politicians (typically from the leaders of the Israeli Left) about their readiness to shift to a strategy of pacification. These signals were-quite rationally-interpreted by the terror organizers as notification of greater chances of success for a rebellion.
A number of authors have also voiced the view that weaker "Palestine Liberation Organization" (PLO) influence in the areas where the rebellion sprang up provides a partial explanation for the zeal of its competing rivals (e.g., Levitt, 2006) . Islamic extremists tried to fill the vacuum using the PLO's weakness to win supporters and activists while also relying on resources provided by the oil monarchies.
But the question of the causes of the unrest seems less important than the one about the causes leading to Oslo. Was the First Intifada such a cause in reality?
An emotional ground for mobilization of the effort (important along with fear in the face of the uprising's organizers) was hatred of the Jews. One of the factors leading to this hatred will be considered in greater detail below, as well as in an additional study (Rotenberg, 2014) . The present study does not consider other factors (national or religious) in any detail. 350   400   1921  1923  1925  1927  1929  1931  1933  1935  1937  1939  1941  1943  1945  1947  1949  1951  1953  1955  1957  1959  1961  1963  1965  1967  1969  1971  1973  1975  1977  1979  1981  1983  1985  1987  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005  2007 The data represented by the graphs therefore raise questions concerning:
In societies where government and the authority with which it is invested
1. The magnitude of the problem of the Intifada for Israel (whether it has not been exaggerated in general, and whether it was worth implementing such unusual decisions as inviting a terrorist organization from Tunis into one's own country?).
Dating the uprising.
We intentionally focus attention on victims among the Jews (Israelis) insofar as we are interested in the motivation behind the decision-making among Israel's leaders. At the same time,
another side is always clearly involved in a conflict. Let us therefore look at the dynamic of the activism and the losses among the Arabs.
The First Intifada is most clearly "traceable" in the statistics of Arabs killed in skirmishes with defense forces (Figure 3 ). But even these statistics do not fit very comfortably into the generally accepted scheme. The data that reflect Arab casualties (only those killed by Israelis) make it clear that the core issues had been left behind as early as 1990. The statistics for Arab attacks against Jews in the Liberated Territories and related losses (see Figure 4) "shifts" the peak of the problem to the moment when the Oslo Accords were signed (September 1993) or to an even later period.
It should be noted that the statistics provided by the NGO Betzelem, which were used in according to data introduced in Rot (2007) . This figure is compatible with 1198, the number of Arabs killed in attacks against defense forces, or with 808 (see Rot, 2007: p. 43 
Problems and Criticism of the "Canon"
Far from all historians accept the understanding of the modern history of backward nations-and of the Near East in particular-as the encounter of the noble savage and the Western colonizing exploiter (Johnson, 1988) .
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Zeev Jabotinsky (1923) warned leftist Zionists that as long as they remained subject to Jewish control, the Arabs would not be content with increased material well-being. He predicted Arab protest based on Arab national feeling.
Since considerations of well-being and rights can easily be disregarded by Arab leaders (see This point of view deserves special attention insofar as Jabotinsky, besides being a politician and journalist, was also an efficient man of action-a "manager of security issues."
Another piece of evidence has to do with understanding the magnitude and the prolonged duration of the protests of 1987-1990 (1993) as an outcome of oppression. The evidence provided by the activist organizers of mass protests came from Polish authors of a guide to conducting an underground struggle (during the martial law period of 1981-88, the so-called "Polish-Jaruzelski
War"). Representatives of Polish society and culture, which had provided a great many examples of outstanding self-sacrifice throughout the 1900s, explained the need to instruct their comrades in the underground in this way:
The memory of heroes alive in the heart of the people notwithstanding, the courageous are not numerous. It is essential to value the security of one's workers, as well as one's own.
You should welcome any gesture of solidarity and act in such a way as to make the silent majority identify with us; however, do not count on attracting it to underground activism.
The people as a whole can resist only in patriotic books (Bielecki, Kelus, Sikorska, 1983).
This means that in dealing with the phenomenon of mass resistance, no idealistic or irrational factors can ever be taken into account as the primary-or the only-explanation. Considered in tandem with the abundant evidence of the extremely rational mentality of terror organizers in the Near East, this statement by the heroes of the underground struggle against communism in Poland casts into question many elements of the prevalent understanding of the history of the 1987
Intifada.
A principal objective of the present article is to attempt to interpret the First Intifada as an outcome of the rational steps taken by the players involved in the process. All players act in their own interest. Small groups, occasionally disadvantaged in resources, win accordingly in terms of coordination and concentration. That is, we mean to use the arsenal offered by the theory of public choice (theory of rational choice) both in identifying the significant factors and in interpreting them.
It is worth emphasizing that such an approach does not entail leaving religious motives out of the picture. On the contrary, we believe that religion continues to remain a powerful mechanism in coordinating steps that dramatically lower the coordination costs. In addition, the display of religious motives-or their absence when it would be reasonable to expect them to manifest themselves-serves both as an indicator of the players' intentions and as a basis for the evaluation (prediction) of the players' behaviors. This is to say nothing of the fact that religious feeling, ritual, and other experiences dictated by religion are an important component of such valued goods as prestige and self-respect, as well as a source of positive emotion (hope) and a means of shock amortization.
Prehistory of the First Intifada
The explanation will need to begin at least as far back as 1967. Two symbolic-and therefore easily ignored-facts played an important part in what followed. There are a number of explanations for this. The simplest in this case is the number of employees in the embassies in Arab countries (to say nothing of all Muslim countries), which is incomparably greater than in the embassy of any Western country in Israel.
What is a more considerable factor, in our opinion, is the struggle of these offices for influence, for grounding their own importance and for funding. Diplomacy based on a clearly enunciated set of policies and principles that remain unchanged through the ages, buttressed by the military-economic superiority of the West, drastically limits the role of the diplomats themselves. Everything has already been decided for them by politicians (most of whom have since departed for a better world), along with the natural advantages of a market economy and well-protected property. Playing "suicide checkers" and claiming some secret diplomatic knowledge, which presupposes measures impossible to check by any common sense (such as negotiations and concessions to regimes or terrorist leaders, all deserving of disgust) facilitate considerable improvements in the position of functionaries in foreign affairs offices.
Policies of this kind can be implemented only because voters who would have otherwise never supported them take little interest. Elected politicians are also often uninformed about the fine points of foreign policy, tending "to rely on the specialists' opinion." In the present case, the "specialists," unlike the private lobbyists, have a strong personal interest, as well as the opportunity to take up lobbying in their working time, using state resources they have at their disposal, including work connections. This means that the mechanism described by Olson (1971) occasionally yields surprising results. 16 Naturally enough, lobbying through a decision profitable only for the diplomats themselves vis-à-vis an ally-rather than vis-à-vis their own citizens-is even simpler.
It is hardly surprising that the State Department has made a notable contribution to weakening the position of Israel, a US ally, and to fortifying the terrorists. It was none other than the diplomats who initiated and encouraged-independent of the administration-a policy of supporting the KGB special operation aimed at presenting the PLO, a terrorist organization, as a "government in exile" (Pacepa, 2002 (Pacepa, , 2013 . Supporting terrorist leaders as legitimate representatives of the people also required recognizing the "Palestinian People," an entity never previously in existence. 17 The first openly leftist 18 US administration (that of President Jimmy Carter) pressured Israel at Camp David, demanding recognition for the principle of "peace in exchange for land" and the idea of a Palestinian autonomy. The same administration also initiated the process of diplomatic recognition of the PLO. 19 However, even though the process did take off under the Carter administration, 20 recognition as such was only achieved under Reagan, thus spelling out the high degree of autonomy and effectiveness of the State Department in attaining its office objectives, even at the expense of US national interests and the interests of US allies.
Special Features of the System of Government in Israel after 1977
In looking for an explanation why Israel opted to give up a successful strategy, replacing it with an untried and highly risky one instead, we must take into account the fundamentally new organization of power after Labor's epoch-making defeat in the 1977 elections. Due to a number of reasons (ranging from direct threats of upheaval to the personal qualities of the new leadership), the new ruling coalition rejected large-scale reform. No constitution was adopted, and the executive authority apparatus remained unreformed (constructed originally under the semiauthoritarian "one-and-a-half-party" rule of Labor).
The territories referred to as the "West Bank and Gaza" were not annexed. The same party whose by-laws state that Jewish rule is to be extended to both banks of the Jordan River failed to annex even the territories to the West of Jordan once it stood at the helm of government. East
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights formed the exception, a general consensus abiding in society concerning their annexation at the time. 17 The very existence of significant Arab population in the pre-Zionist epoch is highly questionable; see for example the following discussion: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1986/mar/27/mrs-peterss-palestine-anexchange/. Self-identification of the local Arab population as "Palestinian" is even more No large-scale liberalization of the economy was put through (this measure had been the subject of discussion with M. Friedman at the beginning of M. Begin's first term in office). The state did not leave any of the principal spheres of the economy, from infrastructure to production and trade of foodstuffs. As a result, the Left retained control over the machinery of the state, the court system and the "public" media, with the schools and universities serving in part as propaganda channels . Such an unusual "division of power"-into the public authority, responsible to the voters, and the unelected (court system, prosecutors/ attorneys / legal counsels of governmental bodies, public financed mass media, public financed Academia)
-undermined the mechanisms and the motivation for responsible decision-making among both The canonical version of the story casts the growth of settlements exclusively as a development that is exasperating for the Arabs. But a different aspect of the same development should also be taken into account. As the ideologically and religiously motivated Jewish population of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza grew in numbers, its significance for the internal domestic confrontation within Israel grew as well.
If a large part of the core group of one of the great parties in the US were to live in lands being contested with Mexico or Canada, the other party would thereby have a strong reason to show flexibility in negotiating about the affiliation of the lands in question. In summary, following 1977, the interest that the leftist elite had taken in defense and security became blurry and indistinct. Returning to the standard position of "oil rather than cannon," the Left evinced an interest in returning "to the borders of Auschwitz." Objectively, they needed some "unsolvable problem" like the Intifada in order to advance their agenda. 21 The Right did not have enough willpower to take on the risks of a full-scale confrontation with the Left, or to face the uncertainties of transforming the first election's victory into a revolution leading to a complete alteration in the system of government. To begin with, the revolution would have involved liberating the legal system from leftist control. 22 Given such a system, the Right is incapable of assuming responsibility for defense.
Symptoms of Weakening in the Israeli Government's Resolve
The 1977 elections brought no immediate change in the status quo. More than that, they This is how things used to be done, or this is how they could be done-we stress againunder conditions of unshakable unity of leadership (including the opposition). In the absence of such unity, the threat of politicized revenge in case they lose power prevents politicians from taking the decisive steps necessary (for the consequences of the collapse of the consensus, see also In summary, we are now ready to present a proper timeline, which will include the most significant developments.
Timeline: Prehistory Included according to preliminary data. A similar or slightly higher figure reflects losses among those formally considered civilians (mostly "human shield" victims). 27 It may be that even a mass execution of the protesters during the first days of unrest would have led to much lower casualties by drastically shortening the period of unrest and, correspondingly, the casualties stretched out over time.
The Left no longer had any reason to take into account the impact that their actions
would have on defense and security once the 1997 elections had shown that they had no more guarantees of a "legitimate monopoly" on power like what they had had at their disposal when they had been concerned with defending the state as their (corporate or party) asset. In the absence of extraordinarily strong reasons to take the interests of defense into account, the Left in all countries tends to support the civil bureaucracy and the unlimited growth of its authority thought-by the orders issued by their superiors were in fact abandoned; they were left one-on- 28 We mean here the massacre staged in PLO camps by the "phalangists," including the "Damur" brigade, as retribution for destroying the Christian city of Damur in 1976 (Fine, 2008) . 29 For instance, for this purpose, use was made of the episode involving the May 24, 1992 murder of Ellen Rapp, an attractive and photogenic young woman (http://laad.btl.gov.il/Web/He/Victims/111.aspx?ID=38206). 30 See also the report in the JTA archive, "New Storm Rocks Army," November 5, 1979 (http://www.jta.org/1979/11/05/archive/new-storm-rocks-army). 31 Clearly meant for the press and ultimately for the Jewish voter. 32 See, for instance: http://www.haaretz.com/news/broken-bones-and-broken-hopes-1.173283 one with a force both new and openly hostile to the military. This force was the legal "Rule of Law" system (Rot, 2007) . This circumstance makes it doubtful that any policy of repression against the Arabs as such could have been in existence.
4.
A separate and independent issue: the near demonstrative contempt for the fate of the Arabs who had cooperated with Israel, which was meted out by the persons responsible for suppressing the unrest (Lockman and Benin, 1989). The signal was received and correctly deciphered by the organizers of the unrest; this is borne out by the high level of intra-Arab violence jointly with the demonstratively cruel treatment of the genuine or independently "appointed collaborationists." Conduct of this kind could not fail to have an impact on the locals' state of mind, encouraging them to support the terrorists (who were demonstrating the real extent of their control over the region and the ephemeral nature of Israel's rule by thus making short shrift of anyone not to their liking). Yasser Arafat was well aware of the signal's significance: this is why he tried to present the practice as a policy subject to his own personal manipulation. The claim was that he had demonstratively and publicly "delegated the authority" to the bandits to rule the regions by meting out retribution as they saw fit. clandestine, and according to the laws in effect at the time, illegal negotiations with the PLO. The fact confirms the view that active, rather than passive conduct was being engaged in by the Left.
The fact of demonstrative illegal contacts 34 and negotiations was on its own sufficient to provoke a new wave of unrest aimed at forcing the other side to agree to considerable concessions.
6.
The waves of unrest referred to in the literature as the "First Intifada" are best studied as at least two distinct processes. The first of these was set in motion when the Islamists' "offer of terror entered the market"; this was seconded by the wavering response of the Israel Defense Forces, programmed to sound an indecisive note. (The Left is not interested in reinforcing control over the Territories, although in the past this enhanced the core asset of the Right-the settlers; the latter were clearly a greater evil than the terrorists from the point of view of the Left as it absolved itself of the responsibility to provide for the country's defense.) The second process was instigated by the negotiations and the wish (the opportunity) that the FATH had to "win it all back." A possible motive for the Left in Israel may have been using forces from the outside to deliver a blow to the enemy within-the settlers-who had made up the core and the asset of the rightist electorate.
Gesturing at the impossibility of conduct of this kind on the part of the Left in Israel-based on the moral inadmissibility of such behavior-is refuted by the history of political competition both during the British Mandate years and after independence. Mutual hostility tended to reach an extreme pitch during this period. In most cases this was due to the initiative undertaken by the Left as it attempted to solidify its monopoly on representing the Jews, an arrangement artificially foisted upon the land by the British in the 1920s. The then leader of the Zionists-the "revisionists" (the non-socialists)-Jabotinsky was de facto expelled from the country, and his supporters chased into the underground. The articles by then-Member of Knesset Yosi Sarid August 17, 1990 and January 31, 1991 ("They Needn't Look for Me"), both in Haaretz, cited by Mann (1998). 35 Let three simple examples suffice: the first, the case of Arlozorov, involved an attempt at instigating persecution of Jabotinsky's supporters by accusing them of a murder they were actually innocent of (see e.g., Lebel, 2013). The second is operation "Seasons," in the course of which the leaders of Mapai not only organized handing over underground Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL) activists to the British, but themselves attacked and killed IZL fighters, all in the absence of any kind of retaliation (Lapidot, 1994; Lebel, 2013) . The third was a provocation-an attempt to stage a civil war in the face of an approaching Arab attack that threatened to exterminate the Jewish community entirely. We mean the shelling and sinking of the Altalena, part of the episode known as the Altalena Affair. The Mapai broke off talks in which the IZL leader had asked to reserve for "his own" people a modest part of the weapons purchased by supporters of his organization in the US. 
Ostentatious Cruelty
Ostentatious cruelty is nothing new. This is not a story about psychic or mental distress (which is not contagious, and should not affect large groups of people at once).
There are some societies in which authority legitimates itself by achievement. Societies also exist in which the legitimacy of authority is determined by formal procedure (inheritance, elections, etc.). And there are some societies in which authority legitimates itself mainly or standard be made more severe-are all quite a part of the daily goings-on (Hasson Nir, 2013). Cases of inviting and taking advantage of enemies from the without against an internal opponent who is seen as an enemy, are not a rarity in world annals. Sadly enough, they can be found in Jewish history too, long before the beginning of the 20 th century.
exclusively by means of successful violence ("Rule of Force": this is the Arab case; see Rotenberg, 2011). In societies of this last kind, cruelty is about signaling resolve and forceful ability (Kazimi, 2008) . 36 Formally, the caliph has the right (if not the duty) to engage in unlimited military expansion. Hence the ostentatious cruelty of the "Caliphate"-ISIS"-and the impressive and by now thoroughly universal support it enjoys from Muslims all over the world.
In Rule of Force societies, the populace has no access to objective information about the forces of the competing bandits. In the absence of such information, atrocity can well be associated with successful coercion. There is no way to foresee the future. Better a well-informed bandit leader, one who "can permit" himself extraordinary cruelty and thus, apparently, be certain of his armed force resources' superiority over his rivals, than a common type or local leader.
Conclusions
If the available facts are taken into consideration, the hypothesis becomes significant that The idea that the escalation was fueled by rivalry among sharply weakened PLO factions or "leftist" nationalist terrorists and the Islamists gradually gaining power is an reasonable assumption; we endorse it, as do most other authors. 36 Kazimi notes the unusual ferocity of the jihadists of the days of the first and "forgotten" edition of the "Caliphate" with Zarqawi at the head, and then, once this last had been disposed of, the "Caliphate" headed by al-Baghdadi. The Americans sacked that first Caliphate, its "caliph" doing time for a while in Guantanamo, from which he was freed by President Barack Obama (Daly, 2014).
The concept of the al-taifah al-mansurah (Victorious Faction) is an important one for the jihadists, and has been enthusiastically adopted by those waging jihad in Iraq. The notion that one belongs to a faction negates the Sunni doctrine of jamaa since it is dismissive of majorities and the process of consensus. It could explain the willingness shown by jihadists in Iraq to commit brutal atrocities since they are more interested in being right than in being popular.
Most of the challenges Israel faces in its struggle against terrorism seem to us to have little to do with failures of different kinds of special services. Fiascoes at various stages are most likely inevitable. The leading cause of the problem is rather the politicians' recurrent failure to choose a strategy. Any transfer of territory to terrorists encourages and spurs them on to further activism.
Returning land provides them with an obvious confirmation of success and victory, something no less important than a starting point for mounting future attacks in the effort to mobilize cash.
Taking indecisive or hedging measures against terrorism, especially when accompanied by proclaimed deadlines, yields returns that quickly melt away. Seen in a long-term perspective, these measures can rather stimulate terrorism than put an end to it, considering that they provide a marvelous opportunity to proclaim yet another victory after the conclusion of an anti-terrorist operation when the military on the anti-terrorist side restores terrorist control over the territories it has supposedly taken. In such a situation, sacking the terrorist organization may provoke a takeover by a crew even more radical both in rhetoric and in the steps it demonstratively takes (by committing atrocities).
Any leader whose authority is grounded in violence will interpret an indication of weakness The Oslo Accords were in no way dictated by the First Intifada; even so, the Intifada is used extensively as a means of Oslo legitimatization. In actuality, one and the same process and one and the same political choice led to both the Oslo Accords and the terror boom. A distinction needs to be drawn between causes accounting for the behavior of the organizers of the disturbances and those causes of the Intifada that cannot be reduced to the terror organizers' reactions to signals of the authorities' weakness. This is the only way to appreciate the relative significance of factors that are naturally qualitatively different from each other. We will devote our attention primarily to the economic factor (the "oppression" component) and the factor of the mistakes made by the Israeli leadership, which proved unable to predict the disturbances or to respond to them in an appropriate manner.
Intifada and the Well-being of the Arabs
The return of the Jews led to an economic boom of sorts in Palestine. A mass Arab influx followed beginning in the late 19 th century (Population -Mitchell). But this did not prevent the Arabs from ferociously attacking the Jews from time to time, foregoing their own well-being in favor of a bid for dominant community status.
The connection between a high Jewish population, the institutions supported by Jewish communities, and tradition on the one hand, and the guarantees of the life of property owners and private property on the other, were probably quite obvious to rational Arabs, and especially to their leaders. Yet the domination of alien institutions automatically implied giving up the opportunity to dictate one's preferences and arbitrarily confiscate the property of the subordinate dhimmi community. This makes the pendulum swing from peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence to untrammeled aggression and pogroms thoroughly explainable in a rational way.
It bears stressing that in the absence of a tradition of self-government or any form of democracy among the Arabs, the motives dictating the actions of the leaders become much more significant than those of the rest of the population. Uprisings and pogroms caused levels of well- 
